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MS # P-041x

GERMAN ARMY HIGH COMMAND

THE CENTRAL BRANCH OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

by

Helmut Kleikamp, Generalmajor a.D.

Translator: v.Boetticher
Editor : H.Heitman
Reviewer : H.Heitman

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH

SUBJECT: Reviewer's Evaluation of MS # P-041x (Vol XXIV) of the German Army High Command.

1. Combined edit and review of MS # P-041x was completed this date.

2. The MS describes the organization and mission of the Central Branch of the Army General Staff, the main mission of branch was to supervise the selection, training, employment, and further development of members of the General Staff Corps. A very cursory description is also given of the functions of the "General for Special Assignments" attached to the Army High Command and of the Army Affairs Branch.

3. The manuscript is one of the 26 volumes of a study on the Army High Command. A synopsis of the entire study is available in MS # T-111, prepared by the OCMH.

4. Reproduction is not recommended.

H. HEITMAN
Consultant & Analyst

MS # P-041x

Helmut KLEIKAMP
Generalmajor
Date of Birth: 28 April 1901
Place of Birth: Ottendorf/Krilla
Krs Dresden/Saxony

After graduation from the Cadet Corps, Karlsruhe, in 1918, Kleikamp was inducted into the army, joining the 2d Mounted Infantry, in the same year as an officer candidate, non-commissioned officer.

From 1933 to 1935 he received advanced officer training at the Kriegsakademie, Berlin and was then assigned to the 4th Infantry Division as supply officer. Awarded General Staff Corps status in April 1937, Kleikamp served assignments as Operations Officer, Inspectorate of Eastern Fortifications, and Operations Officer in Infantry Corps. At the outbreak of war he was transferred as intelligence officer of the Fifth Army on the Western Front and a month later, in the same capacity, to Army Group A, also on the Western front. In May 1941 he was transferred, again as intelligence officer, to Army Group South, on the Eastern Front. Promoted to colonel in May 1941, he was appointed Chief, Officer Personnel Branch, Army Personnel Office, retained in this post until placed in the Officer Reserve Pool in January 1945, and promoted to Generalmajor.

After attending a training course for division commanders in February 1945, he was placed in command of the 36th Volkegrenadier Division on the Western Front in March 1945. He was taken prisoner by American forces near Ob-Teissendorf, Upper Bavaria on 9 May 1945.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Central Branch of the general staff was directly responsible to the Chief of the General Staff and was one of the most important departments of the general staff in the headquarters of the Army High Command. As the most intimate adviser to the Chief of the General Staff on all general staff affairs, the Chief of the Central Branch handled, as the main function of his branch, all matters concerning general staff personnel. Since the organization, selection, education, and advanced training of general staff officers and the direction of personnel policy were among the chief responsibilities of the Chief of the General Staff, it might be considered that the Chief of the Central Branch was a sort of staff deputy and responsible for functioning of a personnel program.

In addition to its main functions, as described above, the Central Branch acted as an adjutant's office for the Chief of The General Staff, processing his directives and orders concerning the interior organization of the Army High Command Headquarters.

II. THE HANDLING OF GENERAL STAFF PERSONNEL AFFAIRS BY THE CENTRAL BRANCH.

General staff personnel matters had been handled by the General Staff Officers Branch of the Army Personnel Office until 1935* , at which time this responsibility was assumed by the Army General Staff itself and assigned to the Central Branch.

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* This responsibility reverted to the Army Personnel Office on 1 Nov 1942.

An examination will now be made of the mission of the Central Branch in connection with general staff personnel affairs, of the problems involved and of the methods adopted for their solution.

As previously mentioned, the most important points in this field were the selection, education, and advanced training of general staff officers and the drafting of directives to guide the personnel policy. This complexity of functions, which represented a closely integrated system designed to qualify the general staff officers for the accomplishment of their important mission, requires an examination of the functions item by item.

1. Selection of General Staff Officers.

For selection, young officers of the line were available who, after a certain period of service with troops, were subjected to examinations at one of the military area headquarters*. Selection was based on personality, character and performance, not on origin. The Army General Staff had always been revolutionary in this respect, considering only the very-best officer good enough for service in the general staff, regardless of his parentage.

In peacetime, the basis for the selection of a young officer was his success in passing an examination at a military area headquarters, together with the recommendations of the commanders of field units in which he had served. These recommendations were written by the unit commanders on the basis of officer's performanceswith troops. Every officer was required to take an examination of his military area headquarters after

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* "Wehrkreise", the basic military area in Germany, in some respect similar to the pre-war corps areas in the USA.

a certain number of years of service with troops.

After successfully passing the examination, the officer of the line was transferred for three years (reduced at one time to two years) to the Kriegsakademie (formerly called Officers Courses)* at Berlin. There, he was trained for his future work as a general staff officer. At intervals, he was detached for service with troops of the different arms. The moment an officer was transferred to the Kriegsakademie at Berlin, his file was immediately transferred to the Central Branch from the Army Personnel Office, which was no longer responsible for him. During this period of training, a very rigorous selection of the officers took place. Selection was based on personality, character, efficiency, as the most important criteria. By frequently visiting the Kriegsakademie, the Chief of the Central Branch was able to form his own personal opinion concerning each of these officers. The Chief of the General Staff also frequently inspected the institution.

The officers who had successfully passed this period of training were detailed for an eighteen months tour of duty with the general staff and employed mainly in the lowest grades of the general staff with troops. At the end of this time, a new selection took place; their performances in routine duties, on tactical trips and tactical walks and in the solution of tactical problems were considered. Only after having completed this tour of duty, about five years after having passed the examination in the military area, could an officer be awarded general staff corps status.

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* Roughly equivalent to the American Command and General Staff School.

The Central Branch now had an accurate picture of the young general staff officer's personality and performance based on his original careful selection and frequent efficiency reports from different superiors. This picture together with the knowledge gained through extensive experience of handling personnel affairs, enabled the Central Branch to direct the career and future employment of the young officer.

During the war, the examination on military subjects was discontinued. Performance in the field with troops and on staffs became the basis for the selection which was facilitated by detailed efficiency reports. The Kriegsakademis, closed at the beginning of the war, was reopened at Dresden and later at Berlin, because of the severely felt need of general staff officers. Owing to the time pressure under war conditions, the duration of the courses was at first restricted to a few weeks. As had been the case in peacetime, the Central Branch was in charge of the courses, so that, by frequent inspections, it was able to obtain a sound judgment of a future general staff officer's personality and the employment for which he was best suited.

2. The education of the general staff officers was one of the main concerns of the Chief of the General Staff, and therefore of the Central Branch, which was responsible to him in this matter. The Army General Staff was to be not only the brains of the German Army, but also its soul and its conscience. In peace, it was to raise the intellectual level of the whole officer corps far beyond the level of 1918. Therefore, the general staff concept had to be changed from its one-sided, strictly professional education, which had been necessary under General von Seeckt and his successors because

of the political situation, and brought into line once again with the intellectual trends of public life in Germany. The general staff corps was to be imbued once again with the revolutionary impetus which it possessed when it was at its best and which was to restore it to its privileged place within the entire officer corps. It was to familiarize the other officers with the great future problems of Germany and to liberate them for narrow traditions and bygone formalities. These far-reaching new ideas of education came into operation only from 1938 on, under Halder, the new Chief of the General Staff. At first, they found expression in lectures at the Kriegsakademie and directives to the chiefs of staff of the higher commands; further development was interrupted by the outbreak of war.

Apart from these principles, the development of the personality and the spiritual education of general staff officers were always regarded as highly important. Through the Central Branch, the Chief of the General Staff included these ideas in his directives. These concepts found expression in instruction, lectures, and discussions during the general staff training trips. At the very beginning of the Kriegsakademie course, the young future general staff officers were instructed that they were to be nothing but assistants and advisers of their commanders, who alone were entitled to make decisions. They were told that this type of service would require strict self discipline and a great measure of tact. On the other hand, it was highly important for them, to develop their personality and to acquire a high ethical conception of their profession and a will to do

a good job.

It goes without saying, that general staff officers were expected to cultivate a close comradely relationship with all other members of the officer corps, for whose problems and suggestions they were at all times to have a real understanding. The educational program aimed at stimulating them to take a lively interest in current intellectual trends and movements of public life and making them acquainted with the prevailing economic and technical problems. The promoters of this type of education were, besides the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Central Branch, the chiefs of staff of the higher commands, who received the appropriate directives from the Chief of the General Staff.

The Central Branch also supervised the personal affairs of the general staff officers. In case of need, financial and other assistants could be given by the Chief of the General Staff who issued the necessary orders on the basis of recommendations by the Central Branch.

The Central Branch concerned itself with all matters of honor affecting the general staff and with all matters of honor in which a general staff officer might be involved.

As part of its educational mission, the branch was to promote the spirit of solidarity within the general staff corps and to counteract all ideas and principles that appeared dangerous there. One of the chief functions was the careful supervision of the relations between the general staff and the field forces.

3. The advanced training of general staff officers went hand in hand

with selection and education. Naturally, this advanced training was concerned mainly with specifically military matters and it was the responsibility of the Central Branch to secure the necessary development and conformity. Tactical journeys, tactical problems, tactical walks and strategic studies were the main media of training in peacetime and also in the first years of the war. Careful selection for the proper positions according to qualifications and performances was another important instrument in preparing these officers and laying the foundations for their further development.

In the general staff service there were two appointments which could be termed the critical or turning points, namely, that of operations officer (simultaneously first general staff officer) of a division and that of chief of staff at a higher level. As far as possible, the young general staff officer was to have served satisfactorily in the initial positions of the general staff (as supply administration officer, intelligence officer and as transportation officer to an army) before he could be employed as operations officer of a division or in parallel positions in the Army High Command. Similarly, he was to have served successfully as operations officer of a division before being assigned as a chief of staff. This principle was maintained up to the end of the war. This program of development and advanced training was rounded off by details to service with troops as a unit commander at company or higher level. It was the responsibility of the Central Branch to direct the advanced training of the general staff officers in such a way that they were employed in conformity with their

inclinations, their abilities, and their talents, in order to enable them to render the best service for the common cause.

The advanced training of the older general staff officers included details to the Wehrmacht High Command and Wehrmachtsakademie* where the command problems of the other branches of the armed forces (Air Force and Navy) and of joint command of the armed forces were studied. Older general staff officers were in peacetime given assignments in industry, to newspapers and other propaganda media, and to armament factories in order to broaden their viewpoints.

During the war, the advanced training of the general staff officers took place automatically by serving in the different general staff positions in the field and at the headquarters of large units. The staff assignments were alternated with duty at the front, in order to avoid the danger of the general staff officers losing touch with the troops. The shortage of general staff officers unfortunately made it impossible for them to serve for long periods at the front.

4. The personnel policy resulted logically from the selection, education, and further development of the general staff officers. The mission of the Central Branch was to pursue a personnel policy which would place each general staff officer in the position in which he could render the maximum service for the common cause on the basis of his personality and efficiency. This was especially important where the higher general

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* Equivalent to American National War College.

staff positions were concerned. Blunders had to be avoided in order to avert serious disadvantages for the troops. Careful consideration and lengthy conference between the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Central Branch were necessary, especially at the beginning of the war, in order to find general staff officers best fitted for the important positions that had to be filled. In selecting an officer for a general staff position, not only were the officer's qualifications considered but also whether the appointment would interrupt the officer's future development.

The assignments of the general staff officers were proposed to the Chief of the General Staff by the Chief of the Central Branch. The assignments were then approved by the Commander in Chief of the Army and put into effect through the Army Personnel Office.

Another aim of the personnel policy was to provide for a numerically sufficient, current supply of qualified general staff officers, and to maintain the standard of advanced training at such a level that qualified officers were currently available for position vacancies. However, it was inpossible to build up a large reserve of general staff officers since, up to 1942, the Army Personnel Office had been unable to make suitable officers available to the general staff in the required large numbers owing to the lact of officers in the younger age groups. The Central Branch succeeded, nevertheless, in filling the most important positions with general staff officers up to 1942. During the war a solution was found by appointing suitable reserve officers to the lower

general staff positions and detailed to duty on quiet fronts. The higher general staff positions were held by experienced general staff officers of World War I who had been recalled to the colors. The lack of general staff officers (in 1942 about 800 were available for 2000 positions) seriously impeded the personnel policy of the Central Branch, and, notwithstanding all efforts, this deficiency could not be overcome.

III THE HANDLING OF GENERAL STAFF PERSONNEL MATTERS IN THE GENERAL STAFF OFFICER BRANCH OF THE ARMY PERSONNEL OFFICE.

On 1 November 1942 the handling of general staff personnel was transferred from the Central Branch to the General Staff Officers Branch of the Army Personnel Office. With a heavy heart, Generaloberst Zeitzler, newly appointed as Chief of the General Staff consented to this measure although it seriously affected him. The reasons for the measure were the critical personnel situation, which made centralized handling of all officer replacement activities by the Army Personnel Office essential, and Hitler's distrust of the Army General Staff, which he hoped to keep under close control by this device.

Together with the handling of the files of general staff personnel, the other missions of the Central Branch concerning the general staff were also transferred to the General Staff Officers Branch of the Army Personnel Office. Only the administration and use of welfare funds remained in the hands of the Central Branch.

Initially, the most pressing problem for the General Staff Officers

Branch was to expand considerably the basis for recruiting general staff personnel in view of the increasing number lost from mid-1942 on, and the demand of the new Chief of the Army Personnel Office, General Schmundt, that more of the older general staff officers be made available as unit commanders. Notwithstanding the lact of young commanders, the Army Personnel Office released the necessary number of battle-tried officers of the line. The main difficulty was to find a sufficient number of experienced instructors for the officers courses. The potential instructors (general staff officers) were at the front as operations officers of divisions or chiefs of staff of corps and had first to be released and replaced.

The young line officers were selected very carefully on the basis of their personality, their efficiency, their good performance in the field, and detailed efficiency reports. The field army greatly influenced the selection of general staff condidates through nominations. Unit commanders were advised to purpose for training in the General Staff service only the kind of well tried officers that they wanted to have later on as general staff officers in the higher staffs. In order to attain as high a standard of training as possible, the time of training in the Kriegsakademie was extended to six months. Naturally military subjects were mainly taught, but topics of general science and problems of education were also treated and played a relatively important role in the courses.

The young officers made available for general staff training came under the supervision of the General Staff Officers Branch. First, they were detailed to higher staffs, then to the branches of the Army not

familiar to them (infantry, armored troops, artillery) at the front and to service schools. This training, which preceded training at the Kriegsakademie, lasted from nine to twelve months. Then the officers were transferred to the Kriegsakademie, where they remained for six months. Thus the young officer of the line, who had already a long practical war experience, received about eighteen months additional training before being assigned for duty as a general staff officer. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of finding appointees for vacant posts, the General Staff Officers Branch maintained the training program at as high a standard as possible.

In order to meet the demands of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office as soon as possible, the training of several classes (200 to 250 officers each) took place in echelons. From 1943 the Branch could expect annually a group of 500 officers, and after 1944 the annual rate was 650 trained, young general staff officers. After completion of their training, these officers were detailed to the general staff for six months; then, after satisfactory performance, they were awarded general staff corps status. For reasons of promotion, these temporary details were discontinued after 1943, and the officers were transferred to the general staff immediately after finishing the courses. During the training period, precise efficiency reports on the officers were continuously submitted, and the Chief of the General Staff Officers Branch formed his own opinion by frequently visiting the school. The main items in the efficiency ratings continued to be personality, character, and performance.

On account of the great need of officer personnel these young general staff officers were appointed to important and high-level general staff posts in a relatively short time. In almost all cases they stood the test very well.

A further effort of the Central Branch to alleviate the shortage of general staff personnel was to transfer line and staff officers directly to the general staff without additional training. But these were exceptions. The practice of employing suitable reserve officers in general staff positions, introduced by the Central Branch, was expanded, and the principles of general staff advanced training, also established by the Central Branch, were retained. In order to prepare the younger general staff officers for the next higher post, they were frequently ordered to act as deputies for the older general staff officers. The further employment of an officer in the Army General Staff depended on his performance as an operations officer of a division or as chief of staff of a corps, or in similar posts in the Army High Command. In order to prevent the officers from becoming entirely alienated from front line service and in order to keep them as much as possible in touch with troops, they were detailed to troop duty (substitutes for commanders on leave) and visited the front frequently.

A serious problem arose through the new promotion policy which provided for the special promotion of unit commanders at the front. The principle, that in the future only those officers were entitled to special promotion were those commanding troops and units at the fighting

front, could not be applied to the general staff officers, who, in view of the lack of general staff personnel, had to remain in their posts and could not be relased for service at the front. Consequently, if no remedy could be found, the especially selected and trained general staff officers were at a disadvantage when compared with the promotion rate of their comrades of the line. A remedy, however, was found in the appointment promotion plan. This provided for a special promotion, after a definite period on probation, for officers who filled specific general staff positions. Thus, for instance, the operations officer of a division could be promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and the chief of staff of an army to the rank of brigadier general. This provided, at least, some measure of compensation, although the special promotion of general staff officers was, of course, not in keeping with the pace at the front. The special appointment promotion plan was later applied to other officers in staffs and schools as well, but it was to remain in force only as an emergency measure for a transitional period. The basic principle, that only such officers who commanded troops in actual combat, should receive a special promotion, was maintained. Apart from these special promotions, the old promotion regulations remained in force.

The personnel policy of the General Staff Officers Branch, in the main a continuation of the policy pursued by the Central Branch, suffered in the course of time as a result of battle and other losses (particularly of older general staff officers) and because of the urgent requirements caused by the rapid sequence of events in the war. The urgent requirements

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included the activation of new units -- particularly the organization of staffs for special combat purposes -- and the reactivation of other units, which generally had to be accomplished very quickly. Towards the end of the war, full adherence to the personnel policy and a proper consideration of special qualifications and efficiency of personnel for posts to which they were to be appointed was often impossible owing to lack of time and the situation at the front when units had to be quickly relieved. In such cases, it became necessary to employ any general staff officer who happened to be available. An extensive plan for rotating general staff officers between service with troops and posts in the Army High Command or other offices was prepared and put into effect. This was a valuable provision of the personnel policy since otherwise the general staff officers on higher staffs and in administrative offices would have lost contact with the fighting front in an ever increasing measure as the war dragged on. The General Staff Officers Branch took over the functions of the Central Branch in connection with the awarding of medals and decorations to general staff officers.

In spite of many difficulties in the personnel field and in spite of the critical replacement situation and the events of the war, the Branch succeeded, just as the Central Branch had formerly succeeded, in furnishing to the commanding officers capable assistants to fill the general staff posts. The strained general staff personnel situation continued throughout the war and led to many difficulties that could be mastered only through extensive improvisations, which had to be adopted in order to maintain a rational personnel policy. The principles carried

over from former times for the selection, advanced training, education, and personnel policy concerning the general staff officers proved satisfactory in every respect.

IV. FURTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL BRANCH

1. Preparations for mobilization were carried out in peacetime by the Central Branch and included the nomination of commanding officers for higher units, down to brigade level, and appointments to general staff positions. During the war, this responsibility was transferred to the Army Personnel Office, although for a while the general staff appointments remained a function of the Central Branch.

2. The functions of the Central Adjutant's Office of the Chief of the Army General Staff were also performed by the Central Branch. To these belonged:

a. Handling of the records of the officers of the line employed in the headquarters of the Army High Command. This activity comprised the preparation of efficiency reports, the maintenance of personal files and the rotation of these officers in cooperation with the Army Personnel Office. After the handling of general staff personnel matters had been transferred to the Army Personnel Office, the personnel affairs of the above-mentioned officers remained the responsibility of the Central Branch, which continued unchanged under the Chief of the General Staff.

b. The organization of the internal headquarters services of the Army High Command, such as, internal and external security, selection

of new headquarters sites and the transfer of headquarters. The general directives were given to the Central Branch by the Chief of the General Staff under whose authority the branch prepared and issued the necessary orders and timetables for the various branches. The headquarters commandant was responsible for the execution of the orders and arranged all details.

In the course of the war, protection of the headquarters became increasingly important; more and more extensive measures were needed for ground and air defense. On the ground, security against enemy intelligence agents and protection against airborne sabotage troops were the main activities. Stronger measures against immediate enemy threats on the ground only became necessary after the autumn of 1944, when the Russian front came nearer to East Prussia. After the Army High Command moved to Zossen, the principal problem was protection against air raids, which were an acute, daily danger.

For the reconnaissance of new headquarters sites and the transfer of the Army High Command, early measures and extensive, careful preparations were needed. Particularly in the last years of the war, the selection of new headquarters sites became a major problem, but owing to quick changes in the situation the contemplated transfer often did not take place. Nevertheless, very extensive preparations had to be made. Since, after leaving Zossen, the Army High Command's headquarters had to be moved to points which were not too conspicuous, the transfer preparations always included the construction of many buildings for billets

and for the accommodation of the telephone service. In order to keep the command organization as small as possible, only the most important parts of the offices, the advanced echelons, were moved. Thus, for instance, the headquarters commandant with his relatively large organization was generally located at some distance from the actual Army High Command headquarters. The installations in the Mauerwald near Annaburg in East Prussia can be considered as an ideal headquarters site for an Army High Command.

In order to canalize and supervise the unavoidable traffic of passers-by, a very rigid system of identification and policing was needed and this system was organized by the Central Branch. A further security measure in this respect was the use of a special duty train. This train ran according to a regular daily schedule between Berlin and the headquarters to convey persons who had official business to transact at the headquarters.

c. The directives and orders issued to the various branches of the Army High Command and to the chief of the courier service, who was subordinate to the Central Branch, were designed to isure a smoothly and quickly functioning courier service. On the basis of these orders, the chief of the courier service regulated the entire courier service, including the dispatch of outgoing and the distribution of incoming courier mail. For this purpose he had available a number of officer couriers and other personnel. Furthermore, close cooperation was necessary with the Army High Command's special communication air squadron,

which was controlled by the Luftwaffe. The employment of the courier officers and the supervision of the courier mail required very accurate and careful work. Above all, the many frictions and unforseen losses in personnel during the war called for great flexibility and a system of expedients to avoid the loss of courier mail, which might have had serious consequences. It is the uncontested merit of the chief of the courier service and of his untiring and always willing courier officers that, in spite of the extreme difficulties, the courier service functioned almost without friction and without any major incidents throughout the war.

d. From 1943 on, the reduced manpower of combat units, particularly of noncommissioned officers, as a result of the heavy casualties suffered, caused the Army High Command to release noncommissioned officers and men from its service as far as they were fit for combat duty. They were to be replaced by female auxiliary personnel. A "combing out" directive was issued. The Central Branch was obliged to enlist a large number of women clerk auxiliaries to replace the highly competent noncommissioned officers and men of the different headquarters services. In order not to disturb the routine, which was under high pressure during the war, the replacement had to be made very carefully and step by step, though the release of soldiers fit for combat duty was very urgent. The noncommissioned officers and men that the Army High Command lost were men of high value, well trained and acquainted with their duties and the various branches released them most reluctantly. Through their devotion and their diligence these noncommissioned officers and men had helped to

maintain the smooth functioning of the services in which they were employed for the benefit of the fighting front and they fully deserved recognition. In the fighting units they displayed the same qualities and performed splendidly.

For the Central Branch, the employment of women clerk auxiliaries trought many new billeting and organizational problems. The situation presented entirely new problems and required careful planning to find a solution that would prove satisfactory to all concerned. On the other hand, time was pressing. It can be said at the outset that the women clerk auxiliaries did their best; they worked indefatigably and performed their very tiring duties in an exemplary manner. They deserve high praise. All services in the Army High Command continued to function without friction, and no difficulties arose that might have been harmful to the troops at the front. There can be no doubt that the women clerk auxiliaries did not always find things easy. They were separated from their parents and their homes and had to live in closed camps, in circumstances which were both simple and primitive. But they worked unperturbedly and proved courageous in critical situations, such as air attacks.

Special recognition is due to the oldest woman clerk auxiliary who was appointed as supervisor. With keen intuition and a great measure of tact, she worked for the women under her and exerted herself unreservedly on their behalf. She had her office in the Central Branch and arranged the employment of the women clerk auxiliaries in consultation with the branch chief. She was responsible for filling vacancies with the proper

auxiliaries and for the welfare of the women clerk auxiliaries under her. The organization of the women signal auxiliaries in the Army High Command was similar. They were under their own leader and were attached as a unit to the Chief of Army Signal Communications. Their billeting and welfare were also a responsibility of the Central Branch.

The employment of women clerk auxiliaries and women signal auxiliaries was an emergency measure caused by the development of the war. But it seems that in any future war the employment of women auxiliaries will be necessary from the outset so that the necessary organization must be prepared in peacetime.

V. SUMMARY

The main function and most important mission of the Central Branch was the handling of general staff personnel affairs. For proper performance of this mission, the chief of the branch required the unqualified confidence of the Chief of the General Staff to whom he was immediately responsible and always available. Once this mission had been transferred to the Army Personnel Office, the Central Branch became relatively unimportant. This transfer was a mistake. It is conceivable that the difficult officer replacement situation called for the centralized handling of all officer personnel affairs in one single office, but this end could have been gained by attaching a permanent liaison officer of the Central Branch to the Army Personnel Office. The control of general staff personnel definitely should have remained in the hands of the Central

Branch since not only transfers and replacements but the Army General Staff itself was involved and with it the highest mission of the Chief of the Army General Staff. When the General Staff Officers Branch of the Army Personnel Office took over the handling of general staff personnel, the chief of that branch actually had two superiors whose requirements he had to meet, on the one hand the Chief of the Army Personnel Office, who naturally considered his claims as the more important ones, on the other hand the Chief of the General Staff, the highest representative and the leader of the Army General Staff.

So it happened that the most intimate and confidential adviser of the Chief of General Staff, which is what the Chief of the Central Branch was supposed to be, became separated from his superior and was transferred to a quite different environment. Later he was even moved to a separate location. Difficulties for everyone resulted, which remained restricted only because the events of the war were stronger and enforced the necessary agreements. The handling of the general staff personnel affairs must be in the hands of the Chief of Army General Staff through the Central Branch of the Army General Staff, a fact which is proved by what has been said in the foregoing pages. A permanent liaison officer should have represented the Central Branch at the Army Personnel Office. This would have been the best solution.

The other functions of the Central Branch corresponded to those of a Central Adjutant's Office of the Chief of the General Staff. They were of minor importance compared to the principal mission and were assigned

to the branch only to secure centralized management.

Central Branch

Army General Staff

Organizational Chart

Chief of the Army General Staff

Chief of the Central Branch of the Army General Staff

Operations Officer (Up to 31 December 1942)	Supply and Administration Officer	Chief of the Courier Service	Chief of the Women Auxiliaries (from 1943 on)
Handling of General Staff Personnel Affairs	Central Adjutant's Office	Managements of Courier Service	Employment and Organization of the Army High Command's Women Clerk Auxiliaries

Assistant Officer

War Diary

VI. THE GENERAL FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS IN THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND*

The office of "General for Special Assignments in the Army High Command" was created on 1 October 1940. The general was directly responsible to the Army High Command: he was assigned special missions by the Commander in Chief of the Army, particularly in the following fields:

Interior structure of the Army,
Morale and discipline,
Administration of justice and punishment,
Supervision of literature.

After the abolition of the post of Commander in Chief of the Army on 19 December 1941, the General for Special Assignments came under direct command of the Chief, Wehrmacht High Command - Field Marshal Keitel.

In February 1942, the Army Affairs Branch of the Army High Command, until then umder the Intelligence Branch, was also placed under the General for Special Assignments.

Organizational Chart

(Showing departments under the General for Special Assignments from February 1942 - 1945

General for Special Assignments

Army Affairs Branch	Legal Group (later Army Department of Military Law)	Penal Group	Special Staff Officer Group (later Supervision of Military Literature Group)

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* Based on information given by General der Artillerie Eugen Mueller, General for Special Assignments in the Army High Command from 1 October 1940 to 1945.

It was impossible to treat this topic in detail because the only available expert, General der Artillerie Eugen Mueller, was not able to cooperate owing to his poor health and the strained circumstances under which he is living. If a more detailed statement should be possible in the future it will still be submitted.

The Army Affairs Branch of the Army High Command*

The Army Affairs Branch of the Army High Command was created in November 1939. From November 1939 to February 1942, it was subordinated to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, initially under the designation Special Missions Branch. In the spring of 1940 it was redesignated Army Affairs Branch, and in spring of 1942 it was placed under the General for Special Assignments.

The main reasons for the creation of the branch were (a) the fact that the differences and frictions between the Army and the Party were growing, (b) the fact that the Army was not sufficiently protected by the Wehrmacht High Command against the attempts of the National Socialist Party to influence the interior structure of the Army, and (c) the growing importance of morale and discipline of the field forces. Work on political questions of any kind, on security, intelligence, and propaganda matters did not belong in the Army Affairs Branch but was handled centrally by the Wehrmacht High Command for all branches of the armed forces.

The branch was organized in sections which had the following tasks:

Section I	Special events, including incidents and friction between the Army and the Party. Religious matters and chaplain's service.
Section II	Welfare and care for the soldiers in the field.
Section III	Discipline of the field forces: employment of army patrol service in the field forces. Care of military graves.

* Based on information given by Colonel Albert Radke, Chief of the Army Affairs Branch from 1 August 1940 to December 1943.

Section IV Interests of the field forces in respect to official reports on the war and propaganda in favor of the Army.

Attached to the branch were:

1. A liaison team from the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command which maintained contact with the Army General Staff in matters of internal security in the Army.

2. A liaison team of the Press and Propaganda Bureau of the Wehrmacht High Command (contact with the Army General Staff to obtain contributions of the Army to the official communiques of the Wehrmacht High Command).

The basic and most important directives issued through the Army Affairs Branch were:

1. Directive by the Commander in Chief of the Army, dated 15 February 1940, prohibiting private correspondence of any kind between Army personnel and Party authorities in official matters.

2. Directive by the Commander in Chief of the Army in the spring of 1940, giving permission to all Army personnel to report actual or supposed discrepancies in the Army to any superior considered suitable up to the Commander in Chief, without regard for the official military channels.

The first directive was symptomatic of the Army's fight against the Party's attempts at interference and of the sharp differences between the Army and the Party.

The second denotes a revolutionary move away from the old tradition

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of official military channels in order to give the soldiers the feeling that their rights were absolutely secure, and to impress upon them that they could obtain their right within the Army.

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The only available expert, Colonel Radke, has sent this short contribution from the Civilian Internment Camp, Kornwestheim. A more detailed report was not possible under the conditions prevailing in the camp. If a more detailed statement should be possible in the future, it will still be submitted.